HM Government

Delivering the Prevent Strategy:

An Updated Guide for
Local Partners

HM Government

August 2009

This guide is aimed at local partners in England but much of the information it contains will also be helpful to partners in the devolved administrations with responsibility for delivering *Prevent*.

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Introduction

The challenge

One of the key challenges for any Government is to keep its communities safe. Like many countries, the UK faces a continuing threat to the safety of our communities from international terrorism. The Government has developed a comprehensive counter terrorist strategy known as CONTEST, a revised version of which was published in March 2009.

One of the four main CONTEST work-streams is *Prevent*, the aim of which is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism.

As CONTEST makes clear, *Prevent* builds on and is linked to the Government's wider work to create strong, cohesive and empowered communities, based on a commitment to our common and shared values.

The Government recognises the importance of challenging violent extremism in all its forms, and continues to work do so, but the most significant current terrorist threat comes from Al Qa'ida and like minded groups. It is this threat that is the focus of *Prevent*.

The *Prevent* strategy has had real success but we recognise that there is more to do. This updated guidance highlights issues which are important to the continued success of the programme.

This guide

In June 2008 the Government published a booklet entitled *The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England* http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/Prevent-strategy/ which explained the background to and content of the new *Prevent* strategy and provided some advice on local delivery.

The key messages in the June 2008 document remain current and this guidance does not change the overall *Prevent* strategy. It updates the earlier document, taking into account lessons learned and emerging best practice, with the aim of enabling more effective local delivery of *Prevent* in communities.

The guide provides:

• Information on *Prevent* for those who are new to the strategy or who are reviewing their existing work;

• Guidance on developing effective *Prevent* programmes;

• A summary of official publications on *Prevent* produced since June 2008; and

• Information on practical support and funding available to local partners.

This guidance has been drafted by the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office, in close conjunction with Communities and Local Government (CLG) and other Government Departments.

Summary of Key Points

The Prevent Framework

The *Prevent* strategy is based around five objectives. It needs to be delivered through a wide ranging local partnership and should be informed by an understanding of the local context.

Local *Prevent* partnerships should make connections between *Prevent* and other associated and related agendas. Local partners can give *Prevent* work different titles but, irrespective of the way *Prevent* is presented, it is vital to retain a focus on the *Prevent* objectives.

Prevent is part of the Government's strategy to counter the threat from international terrorism. Alongside *Prevent*, Government and the police are engaged in a range of work to address other forms of violent extremism.

Effective Prevent Delivery

In the past two years, together we have developed best practice around the *Prevent* objectives, which needs to be reflected in the design of local *Prevent* programmes.

Programmes need to focus on individuals, communities and places. It may also be important to facilitate debate about foreign policy. Communications, and in particular, the internet and digital media are vital to *Prevent*.

Accountability, Monitoring and Evaluation

Local partnerships should ensure that their *Prevent* programme of action includes clear objectives, measurable impacts and comprehensive arrangements for monitoring and evaluation.

Organisations funded under *Prevent* need to demonstrate a commitment to our shared values.

Practical Support

A range of support is available on delivering *Prevent*, including from central Government, Government Offices, sector led initiatives and websites. Local partners need to take advantage of this support in developing and delivering their *Prevent* programme.

Funding

Prevent funding is not intended for a single ethnic or faith community. Effective interventions often need to draw in many different communities, working alongside one another.

Localities need to make full use of all available resources, not just *Prevent* specific funding.

The Prevent Framework

The Prevent strategy is based around five objectives. It needs to be delivered through a wide ranging local partnership and should be informed by an understanding of the local context.

Local Prevent partnerships should make connections between Prevent and other associated and related agendas. Local partners can give Prevent work different titles but, irrespective of the way Prevent is presented, it is vital to retain a focus on the Prevent objectives.

Prevent is part of the Government's strategy to counter the threat from international terrorism. Alongside Prevent, Government and the police are engaged in a range of work to address other forms of violent extremism.

Prevent aim and objectives

1.1 The overall *Prevent* programme has five main objectives which are intended to address specific causes of radicalisation. Local delivery organisations require flexibility to implement *Prevent* according to local circumstances and conditions but it is important that these common objectives provide a framework for activity.

1.2 The five objectives are:

- To challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices;

- Disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support the places where they operate;

- Support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment or who have already been recruited by violent extremists;

- Increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism; and

- Address the grievances which ideologues are exploiting.

1.3 The strategy has two supporting objectives or 'enablers':

- To develop supporting intelligence, analysis and information; and

- To improve strategic communications.

Further information: CONTEST and *Prevent*

1.4 Detailed information on the overall counter terrorism strategy and *Prevent* is available from a number of sources, including:

- **Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism** (HM Government March 2009): http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy/ The first section of this document includes a summary of the history of terrorism as it has affected the UK and UK interests overseas, an assessment of the changing nature of the threat and ideas about how it might develop in the future. This section was drafted to specifically meet local requirements for a narrative that might be used with local stakeholders.

- **The *Prevent* Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England** (HM Government June 2008): http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/prevent-strategy/ This document sets the framework for local delivery of the *Prevent* strategy and provides practical examples of the kind of action that can

be taken to deliver *Prevent*. It includes annexes which address factors driving radicalisation and performance monitoring.

- **Delivering the *Prevent* Strategy: Practical steps for local partners** and **Delivering the *Prevent* Strategy: Good practice examples** (June 2009). These documents provide local partners with further advice on delivering *Prevent* and offer examples of how local *Prevent* partnerships are putting *Prevent* into practice. Both documents can be obtained by emailing Prevent1@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk

Partnerships

1.5 Partnerships are the key to the successful local delivery of *Prevent*. Local authorities and the police both have leading roles to play but the breadth of the *Prevent* challenge (in terms of the range of relevant places, communities, institutions and issues) requires a multi-agency approach. Local partnerships with responsibility for *Prevent* should include all or most of the organisations listed in the *Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners* (pages 8-10), including police, local authorities (social, cultural, children's and leisure services), education, probation, prisons, health and the UK Border Agency.

1.6 An effective partnership will have agreed:

- Aims, objectives and a collective delivery plan, with individual activities/projects clearly assigned to a range of different partners;
- Arrangements for oversight, monitoring and accountability;
- A decision making and commissioning process;
- Coverage of geographical areas,

institutions and communities; and

- Effective mechanisms for shared learning.

1.7 The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), the Local Government Association (LGA) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA) have all published guidance on the specific contribution they can make to local delivery of *Prevent*:

- **Association of Chief Police Officers: *Prevent*: The Police Implementation Plan – a summary for partners** can be obtained by emailing prevent@acpo.pnn.police.uk This is a summary of the guidance produced by the Association of Chief Police Officers for police forces and sets out how the police can contribute to local *Prevent* partnerships and to the seven *Prevent* objectives.
- **Local Government Association: Leading the PVE agenda – a role made for councillors**; and **Leading the PVE agenda – engaging, supporting and funding community groups.** These booklets are available at http://www.lga.gov.uk/lga/core/page.do?pageId=1181586 They are designed to help councillors and local authorities with *Prevent*, emphasising the importance of the community leadership role that councillors provide and outlining the steps they can take to increase their engagement with this agenda.
- **Association of Police Authorities: *Prevent* - A Strategic Framework for Police Authorities.** The APA has produced a strategic framework to assist local police authorities to develop their response to *Prevent* and contribute to the national *Prevent* objectives. It is focused on governance

and oversight of *Prevent* policing, consultation and engagement, and police authorities' strategic role in *Prevent* partnerships. Further information on the role of police authorities in *Prevent* and the APA *Prevent* Strategic Framework are available from apa.info@lga.gov.uk

The local context

1.8 *Prevent* work needs to be grounded in information about local communities and local risks. Much of the information which is required will already be held by organisations attending the partnership group. Since the publication of our 2008 guidance, two additional sources of information are now available which can be shared with *Prevent* delivery partners using new information sharing protocols:

- **Counter Terrorism Local Profiles** (CTLPs) are being produced by counter terrorism police to inform strategy-making at a local level and are designed to give some detail about local risks. They are intended to generate information sharing between police and partners in preventing violent extremism. Further information on CTLPs can be obtained by contacting prevent@acpo.pnn.police.uk

- **Central *Prevent* Analysis** (CPA): These products provide deeper background information on issues related to radicalisation and violent extremism. They are designed to provide senior local statutory partners with information to support policy decisions and resource allocations. CPA papers can be obtained through *Prevent* leads in the regional Government Office and the police Counter Terrorism Unit or Counter Terrorism Intelligence Unit.

1.9 A range of published non-Government material is also now available which provides an important context for *Prevent* related work. Two examples are:

- **Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities:** http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/racecohesionfaith/research/understandingmuslimcommunities/ This is research into 13 of the most significant Muslim ethnic diaspora communities in the UK.

- **The Role of Muslim Identity Politics in Radicalisation (a study in progress)**: http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/communities/muslimidentitypolitics This is an abridged working study on the role of Muslim identity politics in radicalisation, written by Durham University academic Tuyfal Choudhry.

Prevent Research

There is an active social science *Prevent* research programme across Government, addressing pathways and metrics of radicalisation, effective intervention programmes and community attitudes/responses to violent extremism. Research findings are used to inform strategy and help develop and guide interventions. They will be shared with local delivery partners.

A recent example of research work that has shaped thinking on *Prevent* is a process evaluation of Channel (see page 11 for information on Channel), led by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on behalf of the Home Office. This highlighted the need for improved communications about the purpose of Channel to community stakeholders, information sharing protocols and clearer evidence based guidelines on vulnerability and risk assessment. OSCT is aiming to publish key Channel findings later in 2009.

Work by the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) in OSCT has addressed communication themes (audiences, messages and channels/messengers) to establish the most efficient and effective ways of communicating with priority audiences on counter terrorism. This work is being presented to local partners in strategic communications workshops.

Government views on the radicalisation process are continually being updated by new research, although it is evident that there is no single pathway to radicalisation, just as there is no single profile of a person who is vulnerable to radicalisation. New insights will be circulated to local partners.

For further information please contact: Prevent1@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk

Vetting and security classification

1.10   Vetting should not be a barrier to sharing counter terrorism related material above RESTRICTED level. Consideration about whether it is appropriate for an individual to be vetted should take place at a local level and on a case-by-case basis. Further advice, including the possibility of funding for vetting, is available from OSCT by emailing Prevent1@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk

1.11   The Government Protective Marking System (GPMS) and personnel security issues are explained in the Security Policy Framework available from the Cabinet Office website: www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/spf.aspx The Baseline Personnel Security

Standard, advocated as recruitment best practice by the Cabinet Office, is sufficient for unlimited access to RESTRICTED and CONFIDENTIAL material, and occasional access to SECRET material. For further information see www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/45160/hmg_bpss.pdf

Communicating Prevent

1.12   *Prevent* and the associated funding arrangements, such as the Area Based Grant, have been designed to give local partners maximum flexibility to deliver a programme which takes into account local circumstances.

1.13   Some areas have delivered elements of their *Prevent* programme alongside and as a part of associated

agendas – for example community cohesion and safer neighbourhoods. In some cases, areas have chosen not to use the terms *Prevent* or Preventing Violent Extremism when delivering specific interventions in conjunction with these other local agendas.

1.14   Making these connections across agendas is certainly vital and where particular terminology is impeding relationships locally and damaging delivery it can be dropped. However, although the community cohesion and safer neighbourhood agendas and *Prevent* overlap, they are not identical. The remainder of this document sets out areas where they are clearly different. **In using the language of cohesion and safer neighbourhoods it is therefore also important for local partners to maintain a focus on the *Prevent* objectives set out here and to be clear with communities and organisations they may be funding what they are seeking to achieve.**

Prevent and other forms of violent extremism

1.15   *Prevent* is part of the Government's strategy to counter the threat from international terrorism. The Government recognises and takes seriously the threats from other forms of violent extremism, in particular from violent far right groups, though it judges that these threats are not at present as great as the threat from international terrorism.

1.16   Alongside the *Prevent* strategy, Government and the police are already engaged in a range of work to address other forms of violent extremism. Over the coming months, the Government will be further developing work in these areas and specifically in strengthening community resilience. This work will be resourced separately to *Prevent*.

Effective Prevent Delivery

In the past two years together we have developed best practice around the Prevent objectives, which needs to be reflected in the design of local Prevent programmes.

Programmes need to focus on individuals, communities and places. It may also be important to facilitate debate about foreign policy. Communications and, in particular, the internet and digital media are vital to Prevent.

2.1 Two years after revising the *Prevent* strategy and developing the five core objectives we have much more experience of *Prevent* delivery and some emerging best practice.

Radicalisers and the places where they may operate

2.2 Although the police have the key part to play in disrupting the activities of those who promote violent extremism, all local partners have responsibilities in this area. The partnership will also be able to support institutions where radicalisers may operate. For example, partners should:

- Ensure Criminal Records Bureau checks are in place for all individuals working with vulnerable young people;

- Ensure funding is denied to groups or individuals involved in radicalisation;

- Work with other public state accommodation providers to limit the use of their premises for inappropriate activity; and

- Ensure appropriate checks and systems are put in place to ensure groups accessing and using council premises are committed to upholding shared values. The Local Government Association and Improvement and Development Agency recently released guidance on this issue: **Striking the Balance: Managing the use of council facilities for communities**; www.lga.gov.uk/lga/core/page. do?pageId=2164903

Supporting vulnerable individuals

2.3 Supporting individuals who are at risk of being or who have been recruited to violent extremist groups or more generally to the cause of violent extremism is the third of the *Prevent* objectives.

2.4 Local areas need to have in place or have access to arrangements for intervening with vulnerable individuals that include:

- Provision for the identification and referral of those who are vulnerable to violent extremism;

- A means of assessing the needs and vulnerabilities of the person concerned; and

- A range of interventions aimed at addressing the individual's needs and vulnerabilities. These interventions will often draw on a very wide range of community and partnership resources.

2.5 In many areas these arrangements are provided through a 'Channel' programme. The 'Channel' process uses existing partnership working between the police, local authorities, statutory partners and the local community to support those who are vulnerable to violent extremism. *'Channel – A guide for local partnerships'* will be available later in 2009 at www.security. homeoffice.gov.uk This guidance will be particularly useful to the police and local authorities implementing Channel but will also be relevant to other partnerships.

2.6 The support needed for people referred under Channel programmes or other multi-agency arrangements will vary but may include:

- Mentoring and counselling: providing support, challenge and direction;

- Theological guidance and discussion: helping an individual to develop their knowledge so that they can better understand and respond to violent extremist rhetoric;

- Educational projects: supporting individuals through a combination of cultural, ethical, religious and vocational education and, where necessary, also helping them to find employment;

- Encouraging civic engagement: exploring themes such as political and community engagement, volunteering, civil challenge, human rights and social justice; and

- Working with the support network of the person referred: engaging family support structures and peer networks to help them provide support and challenge to the individual.

2.7 OSCT currently funds a range of projects to intervene with individuals identified as radicalised or vulnerable to violent extremism, both in the community and in custody. OSCT is also working with Government Offices and local partners to identify priority areas where the availability of these types of intervention needs to be improved and will fund increased provision in 09/10.

2.8 In cases where an individual is under the age of 18 and believed to be at risk from violent extremism, consultation with Local Authority Children's Service is needed to ensure that the full range of

vulnerabilities are addressed. Further information on safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children, young people and families can be found at www.dcsf.gov.uk/everychildmatters/

2.9 Work with vulnerable individuals may require the sharing of personal information between partners. Further guidance on information sharing has been included in Annex 1 to this guide.

2.10 An important part of work to support vulnerable individuals is the co-ordination of activities commonly defined as *Prevent* and *Pursue*. This means increasing community confidence in counter terrorism policing, making best use of the range of interventions available (so that a *Prevent* response is considered for a *Pursue* problem and vice versa) and using information and intelligence to effectively inform decision making. In August 2009, the National *Prevent* Delivery Unit in ACPO and OSCT published *Prevent Case Management Guidance*, a RESTRICTED guide for counter terrorism police and practitioners. It aims to provide guidance on:

- Integrating *Prevent* into force and regional counter terrorism tasking processes, combining national consistency with local flexibility;

- Supporting the case management of *Prevent* interventions, to ensure there is a mechanism to record decisions and manage and monitor action;

- Information sharing for *Prevent* purposes, covering personal data, vetting and classification; and

- Tactical delivery, with case studies and best practice.

2.11 Although a RESTRICTED document, the police can share this guidance

with other partners where relevant and appropriate. For further information or to seek a copy please email prevent@acpo. pnn.police.uk or Prevent1@homeoffice.gsi. gov.uk

Communities

2.12   The great majority of people in all communities in this country are strongly opposed to violent extremism. Some communities may seek specific support to better enable them to speak out against violent extremism. Communities and Local Government (CLG) has published guidance and studies on effective community-based interventions to build resilience to violent extremism and supports a number of groups and initiatives. Building leadership is critical in strengthening communities.

- **Preventing Violent Extremism: Next Steps for Communities**: http://www.communities.gov. uk/publications/communities/ preventingviolentextremismnext This document sets out the work of CLG to reduce support for violent extremism by building civic, community and faith leadership.

- **Empowering Muslim Women: Case Studies:** http://www.communities. gov.uk/publications/communities/ empoweringmuslimwomen These case studies provide a snapshot of some of the good work that is taking place across the country to empower Muslim women to play a more active role in both their own communities and in wider society.

- **National Muslim Women's Advisory Group (NMWAG)**: NMWAG is a group of women who are in positions of leadership or who work with Muslim communities in Britain. The group was established in 2008 by the then

Secretary of State for Communities and advises on a range of issues including empowerment and participation in civic, economic and social life. The NMWAG can also provide advice to local partners on engaging with Muslim women at a local level. Every region has at least one representative on the group. Local delivery partners can access the NMWAG by emailing PEU@ communities.gsi.gov.uk

- **Young Muslims Advisory Group (YMAG)**: YMAG is a group of 23 young Muslims, aged 17-26, from across England with a broad range of backgrounds and experiences which reflect the ethnic and denominational diversity of Muslim communities in the UK. The YMAG is sponsored by CLG and Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF) and acts as a critical friend to Government to help find solutions to a range of challenges, including discrimination, unemployment, extremism and civic participation. The YMAG can also provide advice to local partners on engaging with young Muslims at a local level. Every region has at least one YMAG representative and local delivery partners can contact them by emailing PEU@communities.gsi.gov.uk or by visiting www.ymag.opm.co.uk.

2.13   It is not the role of the Government to intervene directly in matters of faith. But where theology purports to justify and legitimise violent extremism, the Government will work with communities and institutions who are best placed to refute it and to provide a coherent response to the questions it may pose.

2.14   Examples of work in this area include:

- **The Contextualising Islam in Britain** project, in which Cambridge University lead an established group of academics and scholars in a debate about Islam in this country. The content of these discussions will be disseminated to a wider audience, helping to strengthen young people's understanding of their faith.

- **The Radical Middle Way Roadshows**, which create an intellectual space to engage on issues that are confusing and challenging to young people through the use of prominent domestic and international Islamic scholars. They take place at a number of locations around the country, through cooperation with local partners. For more information go to: www.radicalmiddleway.co.uk

- **The Islam in Citizenship Education project**, which has been developing citizenship education materials for use in Madrassahs. For more information go to: www.theiceproject.com

- **The Faith Community Development Qualification**, which has been developed by the National Institute of Adult Continuing Education to equip Muslim faith leaders, including imams and other Muslim faith leaders, with the skills to be community leaders. For more information go to: www.niace.org.uk/development-research/programmes-of-work/faith-community-development

- **The Review of Muslim Faith Leader Training**, which will look at student intake, curriculum, recruitment of teachers and pedagogy, linkages with mainstream education, course

outcomes, career pathways and aspirations of future Muslim faith leaders.

- **The framework of minimum standards for state institutions engaging Muslim chaplains in public service** (for example, universities and prisons). The draft framework was produced in 2008 and is now being piloted in a number of public institutions.

2.15   CLG is active in all these projects. CLG also works closely with faith institutions such as mosques to strengthen their ability to play a proactive role in their communities, including through:

- **The Faith and Social Cohesion Unit** in the Charity Commission which provides support and advice to faith groups through outreach work, capacity building and training, publications and guidance; and

- Supporting **the Mosque and Imams National Advisory Board** which aims to improve standards of governance and leadership in mosques.

2.16   For more information on these projects contact PEU@communities.gsi.gov.uk

Schools and colleges

2.17   Schools and colleges are an important part of local communities. The Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF) has published a toolkit - **Learning together to be safe: a toolkit to help schools contribute to the prevention of violent extremism** - in response to calls from schools for more practical advice on how they can contribute to *Prevent*. The toolkit is available online: <u>http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/violentextremism/toolkitforschools/index.shtml</u> A more comprehensive on-line version of the guidance is also available on teachernet and can be viewed at: <u>http://www.teachernet.gov.uk/wholeschool/violentextremism/</u>

2.18   The toolkit is aimed at school leaders for use in staff training, reviewing school practice and developing partnership working and is intended for all schools (primary and secondary) and pupil

referral units across England. It reflects discussions with young people, teachers, police, community representatives and local authorities across the country.

2.19   The section entitled 'understanding the issues' at the start of the toolkit gives background information on the threat from violent extremist groups and on what might make young people vulnerable. The second section includes practical advice for building resilience and managing risks under four headings: leadership and values; teaching, learning and the curriculum; pupil support and challenge; and managing risk and responding to events.

2.20   In February 2009, the then Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS) also published a toolkit for further education colleges, in conjunction with DCSF and the Association of Colleges, based on the schools version described above. This toolkit - **Colleges: Learning together to be safe toolkit and Next Steps document** - reflects consultation on the role of further education colleges in promoting community cohesion and preventing violent extremism. In response to the consultation, a next steps document has also been published, explaining how work will be taken forward in the sector. Both documents have been sent to all college principals. They can be viewed online at: <u>http://www.dius.gov.uk/further_education/guidance_and_good_practice/preventing_violent_extremism.aspx</u>

Adult and youth justice

2.21   The **National Offender Management Service (NOMS)** has developed a strategy for the management of the risks of extremism and radicalisation posed by offenders, both in prison and under probation supervision. The NOMS

programme contributes in particular to objectives 2 and 3 of the *Prevent* strategy. It includes work to better understand risks and motivating factors behind violent extremist offending and the development of intervention approaches for extremist offenders in custody and in the community. The programme of work is supported by an intelligence infrastructure, close working with partner agencies and training and support for Muslim Chaplains, Offender Managers and other front-line staff. Further details can be obtained from the NOMS Extremism Unit: 020 7217 2727; securitygroup.extremism@hmps.gsi.gov.uk

2.22   The **Youth Justice Board (YJB)** is running and evaluating counter-radicalisation projects for young offenders and those at risk of offending. The projects are being delivered through the multi-agency youth offending teams and in places of detention. Practitioners have received training to support these projects. Further details can be obtained from Kirk Master Kirk.Master@yjb.gov.uk or Tamara Walker Tamara.Walker@yjb.gov.uk

Tackling violent extremism on the internet

As CONTEST sets out, the internet enables faster dissemination of violent extremist propaganda and provides a means for recruitment into violent extremist groups. But it also provides a way of challenging violent extremist rhetoric and promoting a positive response. The internet is therefore important to the Government and to local *Prevent* delivery plans.

OSCT is responsible for the co-ordination and delivery of the Cross-Government Internet Strategy. The framework has been designed directly to support CONTEST and to address the areas in which the internet can have maximum impact in countering terrorism:

Objective 1: Terrorists and violent extremists find it hard to exploit the internet for operational purposes.

Objective 2: Terrorists and violent extremists find it hard to exploit the internet for radicalisation and recruitment.

Objective 3: The Internet is an environment where terrorist and violent extremist messages are challenged and alternatives are readily available.

Objective 1 is largely in support of the *Pursue* workstrand of CONTEST but both Objectives 2 and 3 recognise the role that the internet can play in support of the *Prevent* agenda.

OSCT has been working with partners across Government, as well as with the police, intelligence agencies and statutory bodies to deliver this strategy. However improved engagement with communities and citizens is vital. Community driven action on the internet has the potential to significantly increase the impact of any Government effort.

In November 2008 OSCT invited community representatives to a conference to discuss the use of the internet in recruitment and radicalisation. This highlighted confusion and concern around whether individuals could enter into debate online around topics

such as jihad or suicide-bombing, without being at risk of falling foul of new terrorist legislation. As a direct response to this, OSCT is producing a legal guidance document for use by communities which clarifies the issues.

Many of the potential risks that the internet poses and practical steps that can be taken to mitigate these are set out in an OSCT e-safety best practice guidance leaflet. This can be found on the Home Office website: http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/Officers-esafety-leaflet-v5.pdf. This leaflet will also be sent to all e-safety officers in local authorities. Similarly, OSCT has worked with ACPO to ensure that these same messages were part of the advice provided to front line police officers in their recent poster and leaflet campaign.

What can you do?

– Find, read, circulate and promote the guidance that has already been provided;

– Ensure that both the negative and positive influences from the internet are understood by all those who have responsibility for internet provision (schools, libraries, community centres, parents);

– Include the role of the internet as an element of general discussions on *Prevent*;

– Feedback to OSCT any issues that arise around the internet that are not felt to be adequately addressed;

– Encourage communities to take action against violent extremist material on the internet themselves by reporting the content to internet providers – or by countering inaccurate views; and

– Consider how you can incorporate the internet into all aspects of your *Prevent* delivery.

For more information please contact: Prevent1@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk

UK Border Agency (UKBA)

2.23   UKBA is supporting work on *Prevent* at a local level through a programme within **in-country immigration, asylum and citizenship** processes to:

• Raise awareness of *Prevent* amongst staff and partners;

• Ensure UKBA is fully integrated into arrangements for the identification, referral and support of potentially vulnerable foreign nationals;

• Develop a strategy for supporting vulnerable individuals in immigration detention centres through a programme of guidance and training for detention staff, managers and the chaplaincy; and

• Improve integration of migrants into the UK through the 'Earned Citizenship' programme.

2.24   It is vital that UKBA is integrated into local *Prevent* partnerships. For further information on UKBA work contact Daksha.Mistry@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk

Communications

2.25   Good *Prevent* delivery programmes can be wholly undermined by poor communications. An effective local delivery

plan needs to have a section dedicated to communications work. This should consider:

- How *Prevent* itself should be explained and presented to local communities;

- How news stories which may play into the *Prevent* agenda need to be addressed locally; and

- How arguments presented by violent extremist organisations can best be refuted.

2.26   Regular guidance to local partners on all these issues is available from the Research Information and Communications Unit (RICU), the cross-government counter-terrorism strategic communications unit located in the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism. Examples include:

- Counter Terrorism Communications Guidance: This is a general guide for communicating with *Prevent* audiences, available by emailing RICU@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk   It is not intended to be prescriptive. On the basis of both in-depth qualitative research commissioned by RICU into how messages are received by community audiences and informal feedback from communities, this paper sets out general principles for communicating with community audiences, top-line messages on terrorism and use of specific language.

- The following products are also available from RICU by emailing RICU@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk

  —The RICU Weekly Update provides facts on topical news stories and issues that resonate with communities. The update includes links to interesting news articles relevant to *Prevent* that local delivery partners may wish to draw to the attention of people in their area;

—A framework to help local partners develop a communications strategy, moving beyond stakeholder communications to using communications principles to support policy delivery; and

—Bespoke communications support on request.

2.27   Annex 3 to this document lists our response to frequently asked questions about the *Prevent* strategy.

Connecting the local and international: foreign policy

2.28   Outreach to British Muslim communities on foreign policy is a key part of our *Prevent* work. The aim of this programme is for Foreign Office officials and Ministers to take part in discussions with British Muslims on foreign policy issues of concern. The events open up space for informed debate and allow us challenge myths often peddled by violent extremists in their attempts to radicalise others. Discussions on previous outreach visits have covered a wide range of policy issues, from Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East Peace Process to climate change and aid to Africa.

2.29   Since March 2008 Foreign Office officials have taken part in 45 events, along with FCO Ministers including the Foreign Secretary, who has held 'question time' style events with audiences of between 80 and 300 young Muslims in Tower Hamlets, Birmingham, Bradford and Glasgow. During his visit to Bradford, the Foreign Secretary also addressed over 2,500 worshippers at the Madni Jamia mosque following Friday prayers – a first for a Cabinet Minster. For further information please contact Toby.Relf@fco.gov.uk or Lizzie.Lovett@fco.gov.uk

Accountability, Monitoring and Evaluation

Local partnerships should ensure that their Prevent programme of action includes clear objectives, measurable impacts and comprehensive arrangements for monitoring and evaluation.

Organisations funded under Prevent need to demonstrate a commitment to our shared values.

Accountability

3.1 At a national level different aspects of *Prevent* work are accountable to a number of Ministers, including the Home Secretary, the Communities Secretary and the Foreign Secretary. The Home Secretary is the Minister accountable for the overall co-ordination of the domestic counter terrorist strategy, CONTEST. Aspects of *Prevent* have been or are being reviewed by the Parliamentary Home Affairs Select Committee and the Communities and Local Government Committee.

3.2 Ministers receive advice and progress reports from a national *Prevent* Board, attended by representatives of all those Government Departments and agencies which engage on *Prevent*, as well as regional and local representatives. The Home Secretary and Communities Secretary also receive advice on the development of the *Prevent* strategy and its delivery in local communities from the Local Delivery Advisory Group, which involves representatives from a range of relevant national, regional and local organisations.

3.3 Police forces are accountable to their local police authorities for the part they play in preventing violent extremism in their communities in support of the national *Prevent* strategy. They are also supported by the National *Prevent* Delivery Unit in the Association of Chief Police Officers (Terrorism and Allied Matters) (ACPO (TAM)) in delivering their own *Police Prevent Strategy*. A Police *Prevent* board oversees police *Prevent* policy development and monitors force progress. Regional Police *Prevent* Co-ordinators also play a key role in supporting the forces in their regions, who in turn report to the Police *Prevent* board through a National *Prevent* Delivery Unit.

3.4 At a local level much *Prevent* work is accountable to elected local councillors and the leader of the council who can and should play an important role in *Prevent* programmes. The Local Government Association (LGA) has highlighted the importance of elected members creating strong links between community groups, local authorities and other partners; providing leadership in the discussion of sensitive issues; and providing feedback on successes and areas of improvement.

3.5 Members of Parliament are also likely to want to take a close interest in *Prevent* work and may wish to be briefed by local partnership groups. We strongly support this.

Monitoring and evaluation

3.6 Delivering an effective *Prevent* programme depends on ensuring that projects within it have clear objectives in line with the strategy, include measurable impacts and strong arrangements for monitoring and evaluation.

3.7 Good monitoring and evaluation will:

- Improve the effectiveness of the overall programme;
- Allow better use of public funds;
- Mitigate the risk of the local

partnership funding activities that are ineffective or counter-productive; and

• Provide evidence for local authorities and their partners to use within the National Indicator Set (particularly National Indicator 35 (NI35)) and the Comprehensive Area Assessment.

3.8 Local partners must be clear how funded work is expected to be effective and which elements of the strategy they are seeking to address – whether it is work focused around vulnerable individuals or building community resilience.

3.9 CLG has published guidelines for local authorities and their partners on evaluating local *Prevent* projects and programmes. The guidance focuses on helping local partners answer the following questions:

• Why evaluate *Prevent* activities?

• What are we evaluating?

• What evaluation questions will we ask?

• How will we assess success?

• How will we collect data?

• How will we analyse the data?

• What will we do with the results?

• What resources do we have available?

3.10   The guidance is available at: http://www.communities.gov. uk/publications/communities/ localPREVENTprojectsprogrammes

NI35 as an evaluation tool

3.11   Self-assessing local performance against NI35 is an important means of evaluation, helping local partners evidence how they are tackling *Prevent* and identify areas for improvement. Guidance to assist with this is available at: http://security.homeoffice.gov. uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/NI35_Guidance1.

pdf?view=Standard&pubID=629824

Further guidance to assist with evaluation

3.12   Several other reports have been published on early *Prevent* work which may be helpful in developing and evaluating interventions:

• **Delivering the *Prevent* Strategy: Good practice examples** can be obtained by emailing Prevent1@homeoffice.gsi. gov.uk It contains examples of how local *Prevent* partnerships are putting *Prevent* into practice.

• **Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund: Mapping of project activities 2007/2008**: http://www. communities.gov.uk/publications/ communities/pathfinderfund200708 This summarises the activities undertaken by local authorities as part of CLG's Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund in 2007/2008.

• **Preventing Violent Extremism: Learning and Development Exercise**: http://www.audit-commission.gov. uk/communitysafety/goodpractice/ Pages/preventingviolentextremism. aspx This summarises points from the Audit Commission and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) Learning and Development Exercise on the first year of local work to prevent violent extremism.

• **Delivering *Prevent* – Responding to Learning**: http://www.communities. gov.uk/publications/communities/ deliveryingprevent This draws together common themes from learning and research exercises into the local delivery of *Prevent*.

• ***Prevent* – Progress and Prospects:** http://inspectorates.homeoffice. gov.uk/hmic/inspections/thematic/

prevent-report/ This is the public version of the June 2009 report by HMIC of its inspection of *Prevent* work by police in all 43 police forces in England and Wales. It focuses on the key themes of assessing vulnerability; leadership and governance structures; information sharing; community engagement and interventions; and assessing success.

Interventions monitoring

3.13   In the first quarter of 2009 OSCT conducted a national audit of interventions relating to objectives 2 and 3 of the *Prevent* strategy. This identified a gap in information gathering at local, regional and national levels about the number, location and type of interventions, as well as monitoring of throughput and outcomes. This data will be collected from September 2009 onwards and should allow the provision of interventions monitoring reports to local partners, Channel schemes and Government Offices. For more information please contact: Prevent1@ homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk

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Shared values

The Government is committed to promoting cohesion and our shared values more clearly and strongly across society. The Government regards the promotion of shared values – including fairness, respect and tolerance, democracy and the rule of law - as a key element of building strong, empowered and resilient communities; tackling all forms of hate crime; and promoting equal opportunities.

The concept of shared values needs to be upheld by local partners in *Prevent* delivery. The *Prevent* Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England http://security.homeoffice. gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/prevent-strategy/ explained that local authorities and their partners should ensure that organisations funded under the *Prevent* programme demonstrate a respect for and commitment to the rule of law; reject and condemn violent extremism and terrorist acts; and support freedom of speech, equality of opportunity and respect for and responsibility towards others. The revised CONTEST Strategy http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy/ expands on this guidance (see page 87).

There are a number of indicators which will help local partners judge whether organisations meet these criteria. They include: its stated aims, the nature of its work, public statements by its representatives or members and the consistency of these statements with the internal practices of the organisations and its engagement with society.

Practical Support

A range of support is available on delivering Prevent, including from central Government, Government Offices, sector led initiatives and websites. Local partners need to take advantage of this support in developing and delivering their Prevent programme.

Central Government

- **Central Government departments**: Many departments and agencies contribute to *Prevent* and can offer support to local partners. The 2008 *Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England* includes an annex on the part each department plays. A regular cross-Government **newsletter** is available for local partners with details of upcoming events and publications, together with a series of working documents on practical aspects of delivering *Prevent*. If you would like to subscribe to the newsletter or would like details of publications please contact Prevent1@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk

- **Training:** OSCT has identified a significant training and awareness raising need on *Prevent* and products are being developed both centrally and locally to meet this requirement. Key learning needs include what the *Prevent* agenda is; the role of individual frontline staff; what we mean by vulnerability and radicalisation; and what should be done to support those at risk of radicalisation. OSCT is developing various products including a DVD-based facilitated workshop and an e-learning package, and working with various sectors to produce specific products - for example for YJB staff and the Prison Service. Other departments such as DCSF and the Department of Health are also developing products for the sectors for which they are responsible. A range of *Prevent*

training is also being driven forward at a local level, with the Government Office network and police playing a key part. More information can be found from local partners or by emailing Prevent1@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk

- **The Research Information and Communications Unit**: RICU's Local Communications Team supports local partners to deliver *Prevent* objectives using strategic communications and is holding a series of workshops throughout England to develop a better understanding of strategic communications at a local level. The Local Communications Team is also available to provide advice to local partners on communication issues and challenges (see page 17-18 above). For more information please contact RICU@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk

Government Offices

4.1 Every region has Government Office staff dedicated to supporting *Prevent* delivery. Government Offices are tasked with supporting local delivery; overseeing performance management and programme delivery in their areas; sharing good practice; and coordinating activity between the centre and the localities. All Government Offices host regional networks which bring together those leading *Prevent* work at local level to share ideas. Government Offices can arrange additional support for individual areas where necessary. Please email PEU@communities.gsi.gov.uk for contact details.

Other sources

4.2 In line with the approach to improvement set out in the National Improvement and Efficiency Strategy, there are a number of sector led approaches to support available:

- **The Improvement and Development Agency for Local Government (IDeA)**: The IDeA has several initiatives to support local authorities to deliver the *Prevent* strategy, including:

  — **Peer Mentors** made up of elected members, local government officers and third sector representatives. They have a comprehensive knowledge of *Prevent* and are accredited to work with local authorities. Peer Mentors provide advice, support delivery and share best practice on the ground and through the IDeA *Prevent* Community of Practice.

  — Regular **workshops** and **discussion groups** on relevant issues such as the use of local authority property by extremist groups and awareness training for councillors.

  — The IDeA **Preventing Violent Extremism 'Community of Practice'**, which enables local authorities and front line practitioners from partner organisations, including the police and third sector agencies, to share knowledge and good practice on *Prevent*. The Community of Practice (CoP) allows users to post threads for discussion and feed into regular 'hot seats' on topical *Prevent* issues. The CoP also publicises forthcoming events, holds an extensive document library and shows latest wiki and blog activities of users. To apply for *Prevent* Community of Practice membership please go to: www.communities.idea.

gov.uk/c/189057/home.do

If you would like more information on the work of the IDeA please contact rose.doran@idea.gov.uk

- **Beacon Scheme:** Four local authorities have been awarded Beacon status for their work to promote cohesion and build communities resilient to violent extremism. Part of their status involves a commitment to share good practice. Information on the some of the work being developed by the four local authorities - Hounslow, Southwark, Waltham Forest and Lancashire - can be found at www. lgcplus.com/News/2009/04/beacons_ of_hope.html Further information on the Beacon Scheme can be found at www.beacons.idea.gov.uk/idk/core/ page.do?pageId=9410274

- **Regional Improvement and Efficiency Partnerships (RIEPs):** RIEPs are in place to support local authorities to deliver priority outcomes for their communities. Work is underway to develop RIEP support for work around cohesion, empowerment and preventing violent extremism. RIEPs can be contacted through the IDeA by emailing miriam.deakin@idea.gov.uk with more information available from www.idea.gov.uk/rieps

4.3 Additionally, CLG is working to develop:

The *Prevent* Exemplar Partnership Programme: CLG is developing a team of advisers with experience in the delivery of *Prevent* locally who will work intensively with a small number of key areas to improve central-local coordination and knowledge sharing, to help build a body of best practice 'champion' authorities.

Websites

4.4 *Prevent* **website**: This website, established by the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism in the Home Office, provides background information, case studies and information on resources and links to key documents relating to *Prevent* delivery. It is intended to facilitate the dissemination of best practice and lessons learned and to enable debate and discussion. To apply for access please contact Prevent1@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk

4.5 The IDeA **'Knowledge' website** provides background information, case studies and information on resources and links to key documents relating to *Prevent* delivery: www.idea.gov.uk/idk/core/page. do?pageId=7890410

Funding

> *Prevent* funding is not intended for a single ethnic or faith community.   Effective interventions often need to draw in many different communities, working alongside one another.
>
> Localities need to make full use of all available resources, not just *Prevent* specific funding.

5.1 Some localities have received additional resources to deliver *Prevent* but all areas should make full use of all available resources, with action to tackle violent extremism embedded within the wider provision of services intended to support vulnerable people and strengthen communities. Existing local resources can often be used to deliver local *Prevent* programmes of action.

5.2 This section describes the *Prevent* specific funding that has been made available to some local partners and national level agencies. Local partners can obtain further details of the funding that has been made available for *Prevent* from their regional Government Office.

Local authorities

5.3 82 local authorities are receiving £15m in funding to support *Prevent* work in 2009/10. This figure will rise to £18m for 94 authorities in 2010/11. Details of funding allocations can be found at: http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/localgovernment/xls/770621.xls

5.4 The Communities Secretary has announced £7.5m in additon to these figures to increase local authority *Prevent* funding through the Area Based Grant.

5.5 The £3 million Challenge and Innovation Fund was announced by the then Communities Secretary in December 2008. Applications are now closed but details of the scheme and the results can be found at: http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/preventingextremism/

challengeinnovationfund/

5.6 CLG funding is not intended to be confined to projects and interventions in a single community. Many effective *Prevent* related projects involve different ethnic and faith communities working together and both demonstrating and promoting the shared values which the Government has placed at the heart of this agenda.

Police

5.7 Under the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) funding arrangements 2008/09 – 2010/11 the Home Office is providing additional funding to establish over three hundred new police posts across the country dedicated to *Prevent*.

5.8 In 2008/9 the focus for *Prevent* delivery was on ensuring that specific activity was delivered in those areas where vulnerability in communities was considered the greatest. The posts were intended to support existing neighbourhood policing teams.

5.9 In 2009/10, a broader approach is being taken to the allocation of resources so that **all** forces in England and Wales receive some funding. This approach will provide funding to the 19 previously unfunded forces to buy dedicated *Prevent* resource in addition to targeting other available resource in line with the analysis of vulnerability and risk and to support national rollout.

Other funding

5.10   Other funding streams for *Prevent* activities are set out below:

- **Police funding for work with schools, colleges and universities:** In 2009-10, the Home Office is providing £1.2 million in additional police funding for specific work with schools, colleges and universities. The funding is allocated regionally, based again on ACPO's allocation criteria, which take into consideration the size of the Muslim population and the most recent data. Police Regional Co-ordinators will work with local *Prevent* partnerships in their regions to decide how the funding will be distributed across forces. All activity should be reflected in local *Prevent* programmes of action.

- **Prisons and Probation:** OSCT is providing the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) with a grant to the value of approximately £5.6m in 2009/10 to fund their Extremism Programme, which spans the whole of CONTEST. The funding is used to support work on intelligence gathering and partnership working, training and awareness, capability and resilience, and offender management and interventions, across prisons and probation areas. Further details can be obtained from the NOMS Extremism Unit: 020 7217 2727; securitygroup.extremism@hmps.gsi.gov.uk

- **Youth Offending:** The Youth Justice Board (YJB) has been given almost £3.5 million in 2009/10 as part of a two year funding programme to fund its *Prevent* programmes across England and Wales. The majority of this funding is distributed to YOTs, STCs and YOIs to deliver *Prevent* work locally, particularly focusing on efforts to support vulnerable individuals, as part of local programmes of action. Further details can be obtained from Kirk Master Kirk.Master@yjb.gov.uk or Tamara Walker Tamara.Walker@yjb.gov.uk

- **OSCT directly funded counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation projects:** OSCT currently funds 10 projects to intervene with individuals identified as radicalised or vulnerable to violent extremism, both in the community and in custody. They provide a mix of mentoring, counselling, education and more intensive de-radicalisation work. OSCT is working with Government Offices and local partners in priority areas where the availability of these types of intervention needs to be increased and will fund additional provision in 09/10. The projects are all subject to a rigorous evaluation, which is expected to report in mid 2010. This will inform future best practice. Further information can be obtained from Prevent1@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk

- **OSCT 'one-off' funding for *Prevent* Objectives 2 and 3 in 08/09**: This fund was set up to provide funding for projects aimed at delivering objectives 2 and 3 of the *Prevent* strategy. Over 30 projects are being funded between 2008 and 2011 across the country, covering a variety of fields from building local capacity to providing interventions to vulnerable individuals; educational projects; regional immigration pilots; work in prisons, probation and the education sector; as well as training and awareness for frontline staff. The fund has now closed but further information can be obtained from Prevent1@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk

- **CLG Community Leadership Fund**
  is providing £5.1m over three years
  to community groups for projects of
  national scope or significance aimed
  at building the capacity of individuals,
  organisations and communities to take
  the lead on tackling violent extremist
  influences. Applications for the fund
  closed on 11th November 2008.
  Government Offices can provide local
  partners with more information about
  projects taking place in their area.
  Further information can be obtained
  from PEU@communities.gsi.gov.uk

Information Sharing

Prevent may require the sharing of personal information (for example about vulnerable individuals) and sharing of information and intelligence between partners on local threats. This section provides guidance on the procedures and legislation relevant to information sharing.

Sharing personal information for *Prevent* purposes

Key principle

Partners may consider sharing personal information with each other for *Prevent* purposes, subject to a case by case assessment which considers whether the informed consent of the individual can be obtained and the proposed sharing being necessary, proportionate and lawful.

Effective information sharing is vital to the delivery of *Prevent*, enabling partners to take informed action to tackle an identified threat. This will sometimes require the sharing of personal information, particularly in connection with objectives 2 and 3 of the *Prevent* strategy.

Any sharing of personal or sensitive personal data should be considered carefully, particularly where the consent of the individual is not to be obtained. The legal framework within which public sector data sharing takes place is often complex, although there is a significant amount of guidance already available. In addition to satisfying the legal and policy requirements, there are some principles which should guide *Prevent* information sharing.

Necessary and proportionate

The overriding principles are *necessity* and *proportionality*. The sharing of information must be necessary to conduct the work in question. Only the information required to have the desired outcome should be shared, and only to those partners necessary. Key to determining the necessity and proportionality of sharing information will be the professional judgement of the risks to an individual or the public.

Case merits

Each case should be judged on its own merits and the following questions should be considered when sharing information:

- What information you are intending to pass;

- To whom you are intending to pass the information;

- Why you are intending to pass the information (i.e. with what expected outcome); and

- The legal basis on which the information is to be passed.

Consent

The default should be to consider seeking the consent of the individual to share information. There will, of course, be circumstances in which seeking the consent of the individual will be neither desirable nor possible, because it will prejudice delivery of the intended outcome, and there may be gateways or exemptions which permit sharing to take place without consent. If you cannot seek or obtain consent, or consent is refused, you cannot share personal information without satisfying one of the gateway or exemption conditions. Compliance with the Data Protection Act and Human Rights Act are significantly simplified by having the subject's consent. The Information Commissioner has indicated that consent should be informed and unambiguous, particularly in the case of sensitive personal information. If consent is sought,

the individual should understand how their information will be used and for what purpose.

Power to share

The sharing of data by public sector bodies requires the existence of a power to do so, in addition to satisfying the requirements of the Data Protection Act, the Human Rights Act and the common law duty of confidentiality. Some statutes confer an express power to share information for a particular purpose (such as section 115 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998). More often, however, it will be possible to imply a power to share information because it is necessary for the fulfilment of an organisation's statutory functions. The power to share information arises only as a consequence of an organisation having the power to carry out an action which is dependent on the sharing of information.

Having established a power to share information, it should be confirmed that there are no bars to sharing information, either because of a duty of confidentiality or because of the right to privacy enshrined in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Finally, it will also be necessary to ensure compliance with the Data Protection Act, either by meeting the processing conditions in Schedules 2 and 3, or by relying on one of the exemptions (such as section 29 for the prevention of crime). There are further details of the overarching legislation and some potentially relevant gateways in the section on legislation and guidance below.

Where non-public bodies (such as community organisations) are involved in delivery of *Prevent* work, you may need to pass personal and sensitive information to them and your approach to information sharing should be the same – i.e. that it

is necessary, proportionate and lawful. In engaging with non-public bodies to the extent of providing personal information, it is good practice to ensure that they are aware of their own responsibilities under the Data Protection Act.

Legislation and guidance relevant to information sharing

Although not an exhaustive list, the following acts and statutory instruments may be relevant. The original legislation can be found at the Statute Law Database http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/

Overarching legislation

Data Protection Act 1998

The DPA is the principal legislation governing the process (including collection, storage and disclosure) of data relating to individuals. The Act defines personal data (that information by which an individual can be identified) and sensitive personal data (including information about an individual's health, criminal record and political or religious views), and the circumstances in and extent to which they can be processed. The Act also details the rights of data subjects.

The first data principle states that personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully, meaning that other statutory and common law obligations must be complied with, and that the DPA cannot render lawful any processing which would otherwise be unlawful. Schedules 2 and 3 of the Act provide the conditions necessary to fulfil the requirements of the first principle.

Data Protection (Processing of Sensitive Personal Data) Order 2000

This statutory instrument (SI 2000/417) specifies further conditions under which sensitive personal information can be

processed, including conditions where the processing must necessarily be carried out without the explicit consent of the data subject. Of particular relevance to *Prevent* are paragraph 1 (for the purposes of prevention or detection of crime) and paragraph 4 (for the discharge of any function which is designed for the provision of confidential counselling, advice, support or any other service).

Human Rights Act 1998

Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (which is given effect by the HRA) provides that "everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence", and that public authorities shall not interfere with "the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others".

Common Law Duty of Confidentiality

The key principle built up from case law is that information confided should not be used or disclosed further, except as originally understood by the confider, or with their subsequent permission. Judgments have established that exceptions can exist "in the public interest"; confidentiality can also be overridden or set aside by legislation.

The Department of Health has produced a code of conduct concerning confidentiality, which is required practice for those working within or under contract to NHS organisations.

Gateways, exemptions and explicit powers

Crime and Disorder Act 1998

Section 115 confers a power to disclose information to a "relevant authority" on any person who would not otherwise have such a power, where the disclosure is necessary or expedient for the purposes of any provision of the Act. The "relevant authority" means a chief officer of police in England, Wales or Scotland, a police authority, a local authority, a health authority or a probation committee in England and Wales, and includes an individual acting on behalf of the relevant authority. The purposes of the Crime and Disorder Act include, under section 17, a duty for the relevant authorities to do all that they reasonably can to prevent crime and disorder.

Common Law Powers

Because the range of partners with whom the police deal has grown - including the public, private and voluntary sectors, there may not be either an implied or explicit statutory power to share information in every circumstance. This does not necessarily mean that police cannot share the information, because it is often possible to use the Common Law. The decision to share using Common Law will be based on establishing a policing purpose for the activity that the information sharing will support, as well as an assessment of any risk.

The Code of Practice on the Management of Police Information (MoPI) defines policing purposes as: protecting life and property, preserving order, preventing the commission of offences, bringing offenders to justice, and any duty or responsibility of the police arising from common or statute law.

In general terms, if the sharing of the information is for a purpose related to policing (as above) and the conditions of the Data Protection Act are satisfied, then it will be lawful.

Local Government Act 1972

Section 111 provides for local authorities to have "power to do any thing...which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the discharge of any of their functions".

Local Government Act 2000

Section 2(1) provides that every local authority shall have the power to do anything which they consider is likely to achieve the promotion or improvement of the economic, social or environmental well-being of the area.

National Health Service Act 2006 and Health and Social Care Act 2001

Section 251 of the NHSA and Section 60 of the HSCA provides a power for the Secretary of State to make regulations governing the processing of patient information.

Offender Management Act 2007

Section 14 of the OMA enables disclosure of information to or from providers of probation services, by or to Government departments, local authorities, Youth Justice Board, Parole Board, chief officers of police and relevant contractors, where the disclosure is for the probation purposes (as defined in section 1 of the Act) or other purposes connected with the management of offenders.

Existing Guidance

- Information Sharing – Guidance for Practitioners: http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/everychildmatters/resources-and-practice/IG00340/

- Public Sector Data Sharing – Guidance on the Law: http://www.dca.gov.uk/foi/sharing/toolkit/lawguide.pdf

- Information Commissioners Office Guidance on Interpretation of the DPA: http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/data_protection_act_legal_guidance.pdf

- DH Confidentiality NHS Code of Practice: http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_4069254.pdf

- DH Caldicott Guardian Manual: http://www.connectingforhealth.nhs.uk/systemsandservices/infogov/caldicott/caldresources/guidance/caldicott_2006.pdf

Glossary of Terms

TERRORISM: there is no single definition of terrorism that commands full international approval. However the present definition of terrorism used in UK domestic law is found in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 which, in summary, defines terrorism as the use or threat of action designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause. The action threatened or used must involve serious violence against a person, serious damage to property, endanger a person's life (other than the person committing the action), create a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or be designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system. (Where the use or threat of action involves firearms or explosives, it need not be designed to influence the government or intimidate the public).

In this definition, 'action' includes action anywhere in the world and references to the 'public' and to 'the government' include references to the public of any country or the government of any part of the United Kingdom or any other country.

VIOLENT EXTREMISM: unlike terrorism, there is no statutory definition of violent extremism (in many cases the two will be synonymous). However, violent extremism describes the attitudes, beliefs and actions that condone violence (and in particular terrorist violence) as a means to a political end. It includes views which:

- foment, justify or glorify terrorist violence;
- seek to provoke others to terrorist acts; and

- foster hatred intended to cause violence between communities in the UK.

RADICALISATION: in the specific context of the CONTEST and *Prevent* strategies this refers to the process by which people come to support violent extremism and, in some cases, join terrorist groups. Radicalisation has a range of causes, varying from one country and one organisation to another. We recognise that radicalisation is an imperfect term, which some have inferred to mean that we are against radical thinking of all kinds. That is not the case.

ISLAMISM: Islamism is a political philosophy which, in the broadest sense, promotes the application of Islamic values to modern governance. The term 'Militant Islamism' is used in CONTEST to specify an ideology which argues for the use of violence to achieve this objective. There are no commonly agreed definitions of 'Islamism' and 'Islamist'. They do not refer to a single unified movement and individuals and groups that define themselves using these terms - or may be described by others using these terms - can hold widely differing views. Most Islamists do not condone the use of violence to achieve their aims. For that reason (and because the term Islamism can be confused with Islam), we do not recommend that local partners use this phrase to define the ideology they are seeking to address.

CONTEST: the Government's counter-terrorism strategy, which aims 'to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence'. CONTEST is divided into four strands: *Prevent, Pursue, Protect* and *Prepare*.

PREVENT: the strand of the strategy which seeks to *prevent* people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism. The most significant terrorist threat to the UK currently comes from Al Qa'ida and like minded groups.

5+2: shorthand used to describe the five key work-streams of the *Prevent* strategy (challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices; disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support the places where they operate; support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment or have already been recruited by violent extremists; increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism; and address the grievances which ideologues are exploiting) and the two enabling functions (develop supporting intelligence, analysis and information; and improve our strategic communications).

PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: the title given to the funding stream from CLG to local authorities via the Area Based Grant. This term is no longer used to describe that funding.

COUNTER RADICALISATION: interventions intended to *prevent* radicalisation which can be delivered with communities or individuals**.**

DE-RADICALISATION: interventions intended to *reverse* or *neutralise* radicalisation that has already occurred. These interventions usually focus on the individual and involve *cognitive* change, i.e. change in beliefs, values, attitudes and outlook. De-radicalisation may occur without intervention.

DISENGAGEMENT: interventions intended to stop involvement in violent extremism - again, usually only at the individual level. Disengagement requires behavioural change, i.e. ceasing extremist activity. It does not necessarily involve de-radicalisation and extremist views may still be held. Disengagement may also occur without intervention.

COMMUNITY INTERVENTIONS: *non-selective* interventions provided for all members of a targeted or particular community such as the residents of a geographical area; the members of an institution, for example a school or university; or to certain social groups that have a common interest such as young people, women, families, students, etc. Community interventions usually come under objective 4 of the *Prevent* strategy, in contrast to interventions for vulnerable individuals which come under objective 3.

INDIVIDUAL INTERVENTIONS: *selective* interventions provided for identified individuals assessed as vulnerable to radicalisation or already radicalised. These usually come under objective 3 of the *Prevent* strategy.

Why does *Prevent* focus on Muslim communities?

- Historically, many terrorist organisations and groups in this country and overseas have tried to recruit people from specific ethnic or faith groups. Al Qa'ida and other like minded organisations have chosen to try to recruit people from Muslim communities around the world and in this country. Al Qa'ida continues to pose a threat. We want to support communities which are at risk from them.

- We need to be very clear that the vast majority of people in Muslim communities have rejected Al Qa'ida; we must also understand that many Muslims around the world have been harmed in Al Qa'ida related attacks; and we need to avoid giving any impression that that *Prevent* (or terrorism more widely) is the only policy area on which we engage with Muslim communities in this country.

- Moreover, in this document we have made clear that *Prevent* must not focus exclusively on Muslim communities. It is vital that our response to the contemporary international terrorist threat engages all communities in a common and coordinated effort around a set of commonly held shared values.

Doesn't *Prevent* stigmatise young Muslims?

- We are not stigmatising young Muslims as future terrorists. The vast majority of young people and Muslims in Britain reject violent extremism. Muslims in the UK continue to make an enormous contribution to the well being of this country. The *Prevent* strategy engages with this majority and its success

depends on their support.

- Young people are often best placed to identify the causes of violent extremism and find solutions to prevent people turning to violence. The Young Muslims' Advisory Group (see page 13 of this guidance for details) seeks to make use of this commitment and expertise.

Is *Prevent* making explicit or implied criticisms of Islam?

- The *Prevent* strategy is not making any criticism or judgment about Islam. The focus of the strategy is on the activities of terrorist organisations, some of whom have sought to justify their action by reference to theological arguments. The strategy emphasises that these arguments have been very widely refuted by scholars and rejected by communities.

- The strategy proposes that where necessary and appropriate Government should support the wider dissemination of these counter arguments to enable the isolation of apologists for violent extremism. The first objective of *Prevent* is about challenging the ideology behind violent extremism and supporting 'mainstream voices'.

Is *Prevent* a pretext for spying on communities?

- We want to be completely open about the aim, objectives and programmes of *Prevent*. They have been set out here and elsewhere in detail. There is no hidden or 'covert' agenda. *Prevent* is not a pretext for spying. It is intended bring together communities, local authorities and police in a joint and collective effort.

Isn't *Prevent* a response to a misrepresentation of the outlook of Muslim communities by the media?

- We recognise that many Muslim communities judge that their views on terrorism are being systematically misrepresented in some UK media reporting. We accept that on occasions this has been the case and that reporting can be inaccurate and sensationalist.

- The Government will make every effort to ensure that the media are accurately briefed on terrorist related issues and incidents and regards this as extremely important.

- *Prevent* is not however based on media misreporting. It rests on a considered and well informed assessment of the threat that Al Qa'ida poses in this country and on the knowledge that the vast majority of people in Muslim communities reject violent extremism.

Is there any difference between *Prevent* and community cohesion?

- Work to promote community cohesion and to prevent violent extremism are separate but related policy areas. Building community cohesion means developing relationships between people of different backgrounds and provides an essential foundation for successful *Prevent* work. But experience has shown that without additional interventions violent extremism can emerge from even the most cohesive communities. *Prevent* therefore goes further in wishing to create a challenge to violent extremist ideologies, in developing programmes to support vulnerable individuals (including in prisons), and in debating and where appropriate addressing grievances which can lead to radicalisation.

- A community which has isolated and minimised the impact of violent extremism will enable people to have more confidence to build relationships with one another and so increase community cohesion. So *Prevent* builds upon and then facilitates cohesion.

How does Government decide with which groups to engage in connection with *Prevent*?

- Engagement in this context means debate, discussion, coordination and the sharing of lessons learned.

- We will continue to broaden and deepen our engagement across Muslim and other communities to oppose violent extremism, promote shared values and understand differences of view.

- But Government is clear that it will not engage with organisations domestically where there is clear evidence of active support for violent extremism.

- Our engagement principles are based on the objectives of countering violent extremism and fostering community cohesion and are applied to all organisations equally.

How does Government decide which groups to fund under *Prevent*?

- In this context engagement and funding are different. Government departments and agencies will inevitably engage with more organisations than they wish to fund. Decisions on which organisations to fund are not taken lightly. The first key considerations are whether the interventions these groups make are effective in addressing *Prevent*

objectives and whether they subscribe to our commonly shared values.

- We will not fund groups which:

  —Express racist or intolerant views that publicly and directly encourage discrimination based on gender, ethnicity, faith or sexuality;

  —Promote beliefs and activity that publicly and directly reject or undermine democracy in the UK;

  —Are ambiguous about their observance and recognition of UK law;

  —Are ambiguous in their stance towards terrorism;

  —Advocate the isolation and autonomy of religious or ethnic groups in the UK.

- Our funding strategy will be kept under continuous review and, should it become clear that the balance of benefit no longer lies in pursing particular projects, we will stop funding them.

Is there a profile of an individual vulnerable to violent extremism?

- The vast majority of credible academic literature on this issue is cautious about trying to generate a profile for people who are either vulnerable to radicalisation or who have been radicalised and are members of violent extremist organisations.

- Potential signs to look out for which may indicate that a person is vulnerable to radicalisation include: open support for violent extremist causes; possession of violent extremist material and related internet based activity; behavioural change, including withdrawal from peer and mixed group activities and from widely used institutions and meeting places; and hostility towards those outside of a close and tightly knit group.

- It is possible to identify factors which may cause radicalisation. They include: exposure to areas of conflict and violence overseas; exposure to violent extremist peer group pressure; the influence of a charismatic ideologue (either direct or via the internet); under achievement at school or in employment; and criminality.

- Much more data on these issues is available in open source material. See page 8 above.

Isn't it all about foreign policy? If we sorted this out, the problem would go away

- We recognise that individual reactions to UK foreign policies, such as military involvement overseas, can be a factor in radicalisation and that violent extremists exploit this when recruiting others to their cause. As part of out *Prevent* work we want to explain our foreign policy and to challenge allegations sometimes made about it.

- But no credible academic research suggests that foreign policy is the only driver for radicalisation in this country (or anywhere else). And Al Qa'ida itself has made very clear that foreign policy is not the only reason why it wishes to engage in terrorism. Terrorists have been attacking and murdering innocent people, and plotting to do so in the UK, long before the intervention in Iraq. They have killed many Muslims around the world, in and outside Muslim majority countries.

Are you are only concerned about violent extremism?

- CONTEST is focused on taking action against those who incite, promote,

engage in and are vulnerable to violent extremism. But the Government is also committed to promoting and defending our shared values, notably democracy and the rule of law. That means challenging those who seek to undermine these values and call for us to abandon them, regardless of whether those calls are legal or illegal, and regardless of what type of extremism it may be.

- But the Government has no intention of criminalising extremist views which are at present legal.

What are we doing about other types of extremism, such as the far-right or animal rights?

- Al Qa'ida related terrorism is at present the biggest threat to the UK. *Prevent* is the Government's long term strategy to tackle this threat. However the Government also recognises and takes seriously other forms of extremism and violent extremism, in particular from violent far right groups.

- Alongside the *Prevent* strategy, Government and the police are therefore engaged in a range of work in response to these concerns. Over the coming months, the Government will be making further announcements about work in these areas. This work will be resourced separately to *Prevent*.